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Walter Savage Landor’s Gebir (1798), a work that transforms a “lost Eastern tale into an anony-
mous English Romance” (p. 105), shaped Southey’s thinking at this time considerably. Byron’s
experiences travelling Ottoman Albania encouraged his extensive use of Islamic imagery, in-
formed his apposition of Christianity and Islam in The Giaour (1813), and contributed to the
formation of his heroine Zuleika in The Bride of Abydos (1814). Einboden’s reading of Mary
Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818) addresses one of the most compelling instances of Islamic influ-
ence on British romanticism. Einboden contends that the appearance of Safie in the middle of
the novel establishes “a hidden ‘Arabian’ apprenticeship” for Frankenstein’s monster. The maiden
mentors the monster in the acquisition of language, literature, and culture. Here, as in every
chapter, Einboden proceeds methodically by offering substantial excerpts followed by expansive
commentary on the meaning of each passage. This approach makes Einboden’s work especially
useful for the classroom, where students and other newcomers will appreciate his relegation of
theoretical concerns and peripheral debates to the endnotes.
Similarly, biographical and historical connections link each new chapter with the last—
establishing a network of Romantic relationships built around Islamic history, sources, and
traditions—and create a sense of continuity among what might otherwise appear to be little
more than a random assemblage of convenient examples. On this basis, Einboden theorizes that
Washington Irving’s Life of Mahomet and His Successors (1849–50) originated in a visit to Mary
Shelley’s home at precisely the same time that she unsuccessfully proposed the same idea to
the publisher John Murray. Likewise, Ralph Waldo Emerson’s uniquely American conveyance of
Islamic sources stems from a book purchase made at Chancery Lane, London, only a week before
his rather disappointing meeting with Samuel Taylor Coleridge. While Einboden occasionally
over-interprets some examples, as in Edgar Allan Poe’s passing mention of the Quran’s “in-
scribed perfection” to describe an especially flawless publication (187), he convincingly concludes
his work with Emerson’s extensive translations of Hafiz by way of Joseph Hammer’s German
edition.
Einboden’s Islam and Romanticism demonstrates that Romantic dependence on Islam extends
far beyond banal caricatures of the Orient. Whether these examples reveal Islam to be a singular
source of Romantic literature and spirituality, however, remains to be seen. Robert Southey, for
example, regarded Islam as one of a series of mythologies that he hoped to explore as part of a
grand poetic masterpiece over the course of his lifetime. Comparable studies of “Hinduism and
Romanticism” could reveal that Islam belongs to a wider appreciation of world religions in this
period. Einboden’s work provides an exemplary model for future scholarship.
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The outbreak of Arab Spring movements in 2011 and the resultant overthrow of entrenched
autocratic regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen inspired euphoric optimism among Middle
East and North Africa (MENA) pundits. Images of heroic Arab youths leading protests in public
squares in defiance of repressive security forces augured well for the belated spread of democracy
to this part of the world. Sadly, however, in two years’ time, this optimism evaporated and a
demoralizing pessimism took hold as Arab Spring movements fragmented in Egypt, Libya, and
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Aug 2016 IP address: 205.155.65.226
608 Int. J. Middle East Stud. 48 (2016)
Yemen; succumbed to repression in Bahrain; endured violence from radical Salafism in Tunisia;
and became trapped between barrel bombs and vicious beheadings in Syria.
Political Islam in the Age of Democratization reflects the authors’ confidence in the opportunity
to integrate political Islam in democratic orders. Indeed, post-Arab Spring electoral victories by al-
Nahda in Tunisia, the Party of Justice and Development in Morocco, and the Muslim Brotherhood
in Egypt seemed to settle once and for all the debate between integrationists who believe that
Islam(ism) is compatible with democracy and the eradicationists who insist on excluding Islamists
from institutional politics. Unfortunately, we are back to square one after the demise of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, the return of secularists in Tunisia, and the authoritarian tendencies of the
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) in Turkey. More importantly, perhaps,
is that MENA democratization is in retreat, not just the Islamists. Therefore, this book is overtaken
by events and, regrettably, cannot help us understand the present or future trajectory of political
Islam in the context of repression (Bahrain), counterrevolution (Egypt), and bloody civil war
(Syria, Yemen, and Libya). The “age of democratization,” the premise of the book, is not there
anymore. What we are left with are political Islamists in prisons facing the gallows, and in the
battlefield fighting a plethora of adversaries that are too nebulous to name.
Bokhari and Senzai offer a useful introduction to the range of Islamist actors in the Muslim
world, explaining how diversity is a much more salient theme in Islamism than unity. In this regard,
this would be a useful book for an introductory course on political Islam. It covers participatory
Islamists such as the Muslim Brothers; Islamic nationalists such as Hamas and the Taliban; Salafis
in the Gulf; Shii Islamism in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon; transnational jihadists such as al-Qaida
and the Islamic State; and even post-Islamists such as the Justice and Development Party in
Turkey.
The authors seek to capture this diversity in Islamism through the prism of democratization.
They begin by asserting that democratization “offers the greatest theoretical purchase in the
current context to understanding Islamism” (p. 11). Such a bold claim deserves elaboration, but
none is given. Chapter 3 is presumably the space in which this theoretical framing was to take
place. Instead, the chapter reviews theories of democratization, rehashes the old debates about
the (in)compatibility between Islam(ism) and democracy, and introduces a three-tiered typology
of Islamist movements based on their approaches to democracy: participators, conditionalists,
and rejectors. This is description, not theory. Moreover, this typology is equally applicable to
nationalists, secularists, and any other movement confronted with a democratic order. One could
participate, one could condition their participation, and one could choose extrainstitutional means
by which to advance an ideological vision of society. It is not clear why this framing offers
analytical leverage to understanding Islamism or democratization in the MENA region.
More importantly, perhaps, is the fact that Islamists in the post–Arab Spring environment have
become quite fluid on the issue of democratization due to two factors: the states with which they
are contending have closed off the option of democratic participation, and some of the liberals
that previously insisted on democracy have chosen to side with autocrats in opposition to their
formidable Islamist rivals. In Syria, we have Islamists who are jihadists wishing to establish a
democracy in a post-Asad regime (the Ahrar al-Sham Movement, for instance). In the 1990s,
the Islamic Salvation Army (which was the armed wing of the Islamic Salvation Front) was a
jihadist movement bent on toppling the military regime in order to reestablish the electoral process.
Thus, jihadism is not necessarily opposed to democratization. Another puzzling anomaly is the
so-called “conditionalist” Salafi al-Nur Party in Egypt, which has taken advantage of the demise
of its Muslim Brotherhood competitor by unconditionally aligning itself with the military regime.
In contrast, given that some liberal secularists have chosen to side with autocrats in places such
as Libya, Syria, Egypt, and the Palestinian Territories due to their fear of Islamism, it is difficult
to chide Islamists for failing to embrace democracy by calling them “rejectors.” Democracy has
relatively few diehard partisans in the MENA today.
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A better framework for understanding Islamism from postcolonialism to the post–Arab Spring
period is the enduring crisis of legitimacy that bedevils MENA states. Islamism in all its forms
has been a response to this crisis of legitimacy, which encompasses crises of governance, identity,
and institutions, to name a few. These crises help explain the emergence and relative strength
of Islamism and democratization, as well as the diverse manifestations of Islamist actors and
the degree of democratic institutionalization. What Islamists think about democracy (be they
participators, conditionalists, or rejectors) has not shaped events in Egypt, Libya, or Syria in
the post–Arab Spring MENA. The drivers of fragmentation, democratic retreat, and genocidal
violence are far too many to name, but atop the list are repressive elites in crisis, struggles for
power within revolutionary coalitions, and identity contests between secularists, nationalists, and
Islamists. And while I agree with the authors’ conclusion that “Islamists of varying shades become
major players as authoritarian states break down and autocratic leaders lose their grip on power”
(p. 185), how Islamists manifest organizationally and their political preferences and conduct will
not be shaped by their attitudes toward democracy as much as by the dynamics of coalitional
politics and the balance of power between Islamist actors and their rivals.
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One would need look no further than the topic of disease in the early modern period to see how
scholarship on the history of the Ottoman Empire continues to lag behind that of other parts of
the world. While scholars of western European, Atlantic, and US history have pinned, in part,
such weighty historical developments as the demise of feudalism in Europe and the emergence of
the trans-Atlantic slave trade on epidemic diseases, Ottoman historians, until quite recently, were
still working out the basic timeline of the appearance and spread of epidemic diseases in the early
modern Ottoman Empire. Historiographically speaking, this geographic unevenness in disease
histories has forced Ottoman imperial historians to fight a rearguard action against the twinned
Orientalist tropes of Islamic fatalism and the Ottoman Empire as a perennial source of epidemic
diseases.
Thanks to Nu¨khet Varlık we can now begin the process of putting this unhappy state of af-
fairs behind us and look forward to a productive period of scholarship on epidemic diseases and
their impact on the trajectory of the Ottoman Empire in the early modern period. In her magis-
terial Plague and Empire in the Early Modern Mediterranean World: The Ottoman Experience,
1347–1600, Varlık (bridging the chronological gap between the scholarship of Michael Dols and
Lawrence Conrad on the medieval Islamic Middle East and Daniel Panzac and Su¨heyl ¨Unver on
the 18th and 19th centuries) plugs the enormous hole in our knowledge of plague in the early
modern Ottoman Empire. In and of itself this foundational spadework would constitute an im-
mense service to the field. As an indication, however, of the tenacity and determination that is
consistently on display throughout this book, Varlık labors on to erect the scaffolding for future
scholarship on plague and disease in the early modern Ottoman Empire. Moreover, and perhaps
most importantly, Varlık puts to rest, once and for all, the corrupted yet tenacious paradigm of the
“fatalistic Turk” and the long-held belief of a one-way (i.e., east to west) transmission of plague
in the early modern period. As a result of Varlık’s hard work, we now have a firm understanding
